Water Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 31

9-1-2002

Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp.
2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002)
Michael Sheehan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Michael Sheehan, Court Report, Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d
1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002), 6 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 177 (2002).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

denial of intervention. Thirdly, the Corps could not adequately
represent the purchaser's economic interests, and lastly, the motion to
intervene was timely.
Lisa M. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d
1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that plaintiff satisfied standing and
subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the Clean Water Act, and
classifying general construction activity as a point source).
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance ("CSPA") was a
California nonprofit public benefit corporation with an estimated
membership of 10,000. Diablo Grande, Inc. ("Diablo") was a limited
partnership building a golf resort on 29,500 acres of land west of
Patterson, California. CSPA filed suit against Diablo for violating the
conditions of their General Permit for Storm Water Discharges
Associated with Construction Activity ("General Permit") in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California. CSPA
claimed this violation introduced pollutants to Salado Creek. CSPA
sought an injunction ordering Diablo to: (1) operate its construction
in compliance with their state permit; (2) provide CSPA with proof of
its compliance with the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for a one year
period; (3) contribute payments to a court-approved environmental
remediation fund; (4) pay civil penalties on a per day of violation basis;
and (5) pay CSPA's attorneys' fees. Both sides filed motions for
summary judgment pertaining to: standing; subject matter jurisdiction;
the definition of "navigable water of the United States"; and defining
what material facts were required of a party asserting a violation of the
CWA.
CSPA asserted the following three arguments: (1) its members had
standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests at issue were
germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor
the relief requested required individual member participation. CSPA
brought its complaint on behalf of associate members. Since Diablo
could not show that at least one of CSPA's members would not have
standing in this suit, the court found that CSPA had standing to sue. It
also held that CSPA's state purpose did not need include a certain
activity in order for that activity to be germane to CSPA's purpose. It
followed that enforcement of the CWA was sufficiently germane to
CSPA's purpose to justify standing. Diablo alternately argued that
CSPA lacked standing because there was no evidence of any fish in
Salado Creek. However, CSPA offered evidence establishing the
presence of both bluegill and bullhead fish in the creek and

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 6

ultimately, that the creek fed into the San Joaquin River, which
indisputably contained sport fish. Thus, Diablo's standing arguments
failed.
Diablo argued that CSPA failed to comply with the CWA's notice
requirement, and therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
However, the court found that CSPA's notice letter met the CWA
notice requirements because it: (a) was sent more than sixty days
before filing to sue; (b) identified Diablo as the responsible party; (c)
provided CSPA's full name, address, and telephone number; (d)
identified the locations and dates of the violations. As a result,
Diablo's summary judgment motion on the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction failed.
Further, CSPA's expert witness showed
impermissible turbidity levels in Salado Creek were present at the time
notice was given, and that this trend would likely continue in
correlation with Diablo's construction.
Diablo next argued that Salado Creek was not a navigable water of
the United States and therefore was not covered under the CWA. The
court held under certain circumstances, where a tributary flowed into
navigable water, that tributary was capable of spreading environmental
damage and should also be considered a navigable water of the United
States for purposes of the CWA. Diablo argued that Salado Creek
should be classified as non-navigable groundwater because it flowed
through an underground pipeline on its way to the SanJoaquin River.
The court rejected this argument and held that Salado Creek was a
tributary of the San Joaquin River, despite the fact that, in certain
areas, it flowed through an underground pipe. Therefore, Diablo's
motion for summary judgment failed on the issue of whether Salado
Creek was to be classified as navigable water of the United States.
Finally, Diablo argued that CSPA provided no evidence showing
their discharge fit into the classification required and defined by the
CWA. They based this on CSPA's inability to name a point source
discharge of any pollutants. The court clarified that courts have
previously recognized construction as a point source activity. As a
result, CSPA sufficiently defined a point source as required under the
CWA. The court also held that CSPA did not need to prove that
Diablo's discharge violated the Act at the summary judgment stage of
litigation. Instead, they need only show that there was a genuine issue
of material fact for dispute at trial. Therefore, the court rejected
Diablo's final motion for summary judgment because CSPA defined a
point source as required by the CWA, and CSPA was not required to
prove that the discharge was a violation of the CWA at this stage of
litigation.
Michael Sheehan

